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ZONING AND LOW COST HOUSING
White v. Cincinnati
101 Ohio App. 160, 138 N.E. 2d 412 (1956)
The Cincinnati Metropolitan Housing Authority1 selected as a site
for the development of low cost housing a tract of thirteen and one-
half acres owned by the plaintiffs and located in the City of Cincinnati.
Wiihout having purchased or acquired the tract the Authority requested
the City to re-zone it from "industrial A" to "residence C." The plain-
tiffs' tract had been zoned for industrial use for over thirty years. No
substantial change in the condition of the tract had occurred, other than
the establishment of several industries in the surrounding area. The
tract itself was not in an unsafe or unsanitary condition, but a shortage
of safe, sanitary housing did exist in Cincinnati. The Authority claimed
such re-zoning was a prerequisite to obtaining federal financial assist-
ance for the proposed housing project. The City rezoned the property
"for no other reason or purpose than the Authority' request." The
plaintiffs sought to have the ordinance declared void and its enforce-
ment enjoined. The Court of Appeals held that the existence of a
shortage of safe, sanitary housing in the city generally did not justify
the rezoning of the tract. The ordinance was therefore void and its
enforcement enjoined. The Court suggested that re-zoning might be
justified if the Authority acquired title to the tract.
Ever since the Supreme Court of the United States sustained the
comprehensive zoning plan of the Village of Euclid, literally thousands
of communities have accepted zoning as the means to assure an orderly,
physical pattern of growth.2 In providing sites for the erection of low
cost housing and the redevelopment of existing housing areas, zoning
has been an indispensable tool in the hands of the city planners and
housing authorities. Today, finding appropriate housing sites is a difficult
undertaking. The difficulty arises because many communities have been
underzoned for multiple housing.3 The lack of available sites has
necessitated the re-zoning of residential and industrial areas. The
present case illustrates the essential relationship that exists between
zoning and housing and redevelopment. Here, the Authority had lo-
cated a site it considered suitable. However, it appeared to find itself in
1 This is a body politic existing under the laws of the state. OHIO REv. CODE
§3735.50.
2 Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). In the pre-
ceding year the Ohio Supreme Court upheld a comprehensive plan for the City
of Cincinnati under the home rule provision of OHio CONsT. art. XVIII, §3. Pritz v.
Messer, 112 Ohio St. 628, 149 N.E. 30 (1925). This is the landmark case in Ohio
upholding the right of a municipality to regulate the use of the property by its
police power.
3 Seigel, Relation of Planning and Zoning to Housing Policy and Law,
20 L. AND CONTEMP. PROB. 419, 421 (1955).
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the dilemma that to secure Federal assistance required a re-zoning, yet
the court prohibited re-zoning until the tract was purchased.
The statement of the case and the opinion of the Court do not
clearly show the fact findings upon which the decision was based. At
one point, the Court stated that the zoning ordinance was passed in
compliance with the request of the Authority "and for no other reason."
It is apparent that the failure of the City to exercise its discretion and
delegate its responsibility for decision making to the Housing Authority
would constitute arbitrary action.4 Any action based solely upon a "mere
request" is an abandonment of legislative responsibility and nullification
of such action is clearly justified. However, it is highly improbable that
upon the request of the Authority the City blindly and without any
consideration re-zoned the area for multiple housing. Such complete
abdication of responsibility is difficult to visualize. The ultimate de-
cision of the Court is justified if no discretion was exercised by the
City. But, other than the quoted remark there is no indication that this
was the basis for finding the ordinance fatally arbitrary.
It might be assumed that the Court found that this particular tract
was not suitable to be restricted to "residence C" use. The zoning
ordinance in this case would be discriminatory and unreasonable as
applied to the plaintiffs if there existed no valid reason for the zoning
classification. The justification for re-zoning would appear to rest on
either the need of the immediate area or the need of the community
as a whole.
Zoning regulations imposed upon property must, of course, bear a
reasonable and substantial relation to the accomplishment of some pur-
pose fairly within the scope of the police power.5 If no such relationship
exists, it should be declared void. As the first step in determining the
reasonableness of the ordinance, the Court looked to the immediate area.
It found that the tract had been zoned industrial for thirty years, that
the surrounding conditions were unchanged, and that the tract was not
unsafe or unsanitary. These findings seem to substantiate that there was
no need in the immediate area to justify the re-zoning. This, however,
does not rebut the presumption of reasonableness. The Court had to
take the further step and find that no legitimate reason existed for the
4A municipal council cannot delegate to a municipal officer power to decide
legislative matters, since chosen by the people to legislate, the public is entitled to
their judgment and discretion. State ex rel. Strigley v. Woodworth, 33 Ohio App.
406, 169 N.E. 713 (1929).
5A zoning ordinance is valid if there is a substantial relation to the public
health, safety, morals, or general welfare. Pritz v. Messer, supra note 2; Youngs-
town v. Kahn Bros. Bldg. Co., 112 Ohio St. 654, 148 N.E. 842 (1925); Pearce v.
Youngstown, 100 Ohio App. 22, 135 N.E. 2d 430 (1954); inhibition to use
property for business and industrial use to the serious detriment of owner where
there was no relationship to the general welfare was held unconstitutional in
Mehl v. Stegner, 38 Ohio App. 416, 175 N.E. 712 (1930).
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reclassification.6 Until such a finding, the Court had no basis to declare
the ordinance arbitrary and unreasonable. The ordinance might have
been arbitrary if under these conditions neither the plaintiffs nor other
private persons could economically develop the area for residential use.7
The difficulty with this analysis is that the Court never specifically stated
that the area was unsuitable for multiple housing development.
Comments such as "no comparable trend toward residential use"
indicate that the Court found the tract was more suitable for industrial
purposes. If this was the reasoning of the Court, it violates one of the
basic tenets of judicial power. It is an established rule that a court can-
not substitute its judgment for that of a legislative body.' This area
has always been marked "off-limits." The fact that industrial develop-
ment of this tract is diverted from its natural course by re-zoning is not
sufficient to inv~1idate the ordinance. True, the property in this case
might be worth more if industrial. In fact, it might be more readily
adaptable for industrial purposes. But, the best use with relation to the
over-all community need is a matter of judgment which rests basically
with the City. There is a vast difference between the Court finding the
area more suitable for industrial and finding it unsuitable for residential.
Only the latter justifies judicial interference.
Even though the condition of the immediate area did not justify
rezoning, the question remained of whether the general community need
justified it. The greatest weight for the Court's decision was that the
re-zoning was not to relieve a condition in the immediate locality, but
to relieve a condition in some other area of the City. The Court con-
6 Restricting a trailer camp to residential uses for no public reason is in
contravention of both the Ohio and Federal Constitutions, Kessler v. Smith, 142
N.E. 2d.231 (Ohio App. 1957); see also Clifton Hills Realty Co. v. Cincinnati,
60 Ohio App. 443, 21 N.E. 2d 993 (1938); State ex rel. Kuhlman v. Cincinnati,
32 Ohio L. Abs. 325, 18 Ohio Op. 405 (1940). The legislative body has the pre-
sumption that the enacted law is reasonable and this must be clearly rebutted
before a finding of arbitrariness can be entered, Mehl v. Stegner, supra note 5.7 The Supreme Court in Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1927) held a
zoning ordinance invalid upon finding "that no practical use can be made of the
land in question for residential puposes because, among other reasons related,
there would not be an adequate return on the amount of any investment for the
development of the property." State ex rel. Euverland v. Miller, 98 Ohio App.
283, 129 N.E. 2d 209 (1954) ; Murdock v. City of Norwood, 25 Ohio L. Abs. 233,
9 Ohio Op. 399 (1937).
8 The' legislative act must control unless there has been a clear abuse of
power, Youngstown v. Kahn Bros. Bldg. Co., supra note 5, or the ordinance is
unreasonable, State ex rel. Strigley v. Woodworth, supra note 4; Central Trust Co.
v. Cincinnati, 62 Ohio App. 139, 23 N.E. 2d 450 (1939) ; see also supra note 2.9 A rezoning of an industrial area to residential to preserve it for the
further expansion of the University of Minnesota was upheld in American Woods
Products Co. v. City of Minneapolis, 21 F. 2d 440 (D. Minn. 1927); Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., supra note 2; State ex rel. Kuhlman v. Cincinnati,
supra note 6. The extent of impairment will be tested by the facts of the individual
case, Curtiss v. Cleveland, 74 Ohio L. Abs. 499, 130 N.E. 2d 342 (1955).
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sidered this to be a taking from one for the benefit of another without
compensation. Thus, it appears the Court used a geographical criterion
to determine reasonableness. Such an approach runs headlong into the
concept of comprehensive zoning in the Euclid case."0 The basis for
justifying zoning as established by the Supreme Court in that case is
the effect of the land use upon the community as a whole and not just
the immediate area. Comprehensive means all-inclusive. City planners
must look to the over-all community needs and cannot limit themselves
to the existing conditions within a segregated area. Here, the Court as
a matter of fact did find a shortage of safe, sanitary housing existed in
Cincinnati. Assuming re-zoning served no purpose in the immediate
area, it did not follow it served no purpose in relation to the city-wide
problem of inadequate housing. It is implicit from the fact that zoning
must bear a relation to the general welfare that its effect upon the whole
community must be considered. 1 The Ohio courts have stated that a
person buying and using property has the right to rely on the rule of
law that classification will not be changed unless required by the good
of the whole. 2 The condition of the immediate area has not been
recognized as the controlling factor in determining the reasonableness
of the use of the police power. To restrict zoning to the needs of the
immediate area effected would hobble the City's ability to plan for a
better balanced community. It appears in the present case that the
Court refused altogether to consider whether the need of the com-
munity justified the re-zoning. Since the consideration of "remoteness"
was erroneous, this left only the finding that nothing in the immediate
area demanded a re-zoning. This again suggests that the Court was
actually substituting its judgment as to the proper use of this particular
tract. If so, the constitutional test of unreasonableness was never met
and the decision was unjustified.
The Court made strong reference to the fact that the Authority
had in no way committed itself to purchase and develop the area. The
contemplative nature of the plan would be of extreme importance if
the City or the Authority were condemning this tract of land. It is
fundamental that property may not be taken unless there is a public
10 Supra note 2; State ex rel. City Ice and Fuel Co. v. Stegner, 120 Ohio St.
418, 166 N.E. 226 (1929).
11 See supra notes 2, 5, and 6. In the case Pearce v. City of Youngstown,
supra note 5, the immediate area had not changed and people had purchased and
improved the property in reliance on such existing zoning. The court held that
the plaintiff had failed to show the low-cost housing project had no relation to
the general health, safety and welfare and therefore the presumption of reason-
ableness was not overcome.
12 Clifton Hills Realty Co. v. Cincinnati, supra note 6; State ex rel. Kuhlman
v. Cincinnati, supra note 6; Cleveland Trust Co. v. Village of Brooklyn, 92 Ohio
App. 351, 110 N.E. 2d 440, appeal dismissed, 158 Ohio St. 258, 108 N.E. 2d 258
(1952).
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necessity.' 3 Because of the increasing demands upon government, the
modern concept of "public purpose" has been kept elastic and made
adaptable to changing conditions. 4 With the increased growth of our
cities, the proposition that slum clearance is a public purpose is un-
questioned. A rehabilitation program is also one for which the power of
eminent domain may be exercised." The power is used not only for
demolishing slums,'6 but also in acquiring property not located in the
slum area.
17
There exists authority in the Ohio case of Henle v. City of Euclid
that the right to freeze property solely upon a possible future use is
without foundation.' 8 In that case the city tried to re-zone the area to
preserve its status in the event it decided to take it as a site for a free-
way. It was evident that it would be an unjust taking of property
rights to compel one to pay taxes without benefit of use until the land
was appropriated. This situation was litigated again in Sun Oil Co. v.
City of Euclid,'9 when the city tried to appropriate the land after its
efforts to re-zone had failed. The Court enjoined the appropriation as
an "abortive attempt to acquire title." No power existed for the exercise
of eminent domain by reason of the tentative nature of the plan. In
short, no need existed.
The plan in the present case, as in Sun Oil, was merely in con-
templation and this is the antithesis of a public need. You cannot need
something you have not decided you want. The Court was correct in
13 Pontiac Improvement Co. v. Cleveland Metropolitan Park Dist., 104 Ohio
St. 447, 135 N.E. 635 (1922); followed and modified by State ex rel. Bruestle v.
Rich, 159 Ohio St. 13, 110 N.E. 2d 778 (1953); St. Stephen's Club v. Youngstown
Metropolitan Housing Authority, 160 Ohio St. 194, 115 N.E. 2d 385 (1953) ; State
ex rel. Kearns v. Ohio Power Co., 163 Ohio St. 451, 127 N.E. 2d 394 (1955).1 4 The complexity of society demands increased governmental interference,
Home Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1933) ; The court stated in
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., supra note 2, that ". . while the meaning
of constitutional guaranties never varies, the scope of their application must ex-
pand or contract to meet the new and different conditions which are constantly
coming within the field of operation." 272 U.S. at 387.
'
5 Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) which included not only slums but
blighted areas that tend to produce slums. The court stated, ". . . miserable and
disreputable conditions may do more than spread disease and crime and im-
morality. They may also suffocate the spirit by reducing the people who live there
to the status of cattle." 348 U.S. at 32; State ex rel. Bruestle v. Rich, supra note 13;
Johnson, Constitutional Law and Community Planning, 20 L AND CONTEMP. PROB.
199 (1955).
16 See note 15 supra. There is no restriction against later selling condemned
land to private persons. Cincinnati v. Vester, 281 U.S. 439 (1930) ; Berman v.
Parker, supra note 15; State ex rel. Dalton v. Land Clearance Authority, 276
S.W. 2d 44 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1954).
17 St. Stephen's Club v. Youngstown Metropolitan Housing Authority, supra
note 13.
1897 Ohio App. 258, 118 N.E. 2d 682 (1954).
19 164 Ohio St. 265, 130 N.E. 2d 336 (1956).
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its statement of eminent domain law. But, this was completely ir-
relevant. This case did not involve a "taking" under eminent domain,
but rather a "re-zoning" under the police powers. The test to be applied
was the suitability of the land and its relationship to the general welfare
of the community.20 The existence of the tentative plans of the Au-
thority to develop the area were of no consequence. The absence of a
need required by eminent domain law has no effect upon the reasonable-
ness of a zoning ordinance. If the re-zoning would have been valid in
the absence of any contemplated taking, then it is valid regardless of any
contemplated taking.
It might be noted that the Court did not appear to question the
right of the Authority to ultimately acquire the property. Under our
present law, some doubt may be raised if an appropriation is valid when
the taking is not coupled with slum elimination.2
The entanglement with eminent domain law arose from the Court's
failure to disassociate the zoning from the housing project. This was
partly fostered by the Authority's contention that re-zoning was re-
quired to qualify for Federal aid. As illustrated, zoning laws could
impair the efficacy of a housing authority in carrying out its project.
A reclassification of use before a condemnation may be void because the
land is unsuitable for private development. At the same time, property
cannot be taken for a purpose which is prohibited by an applicable zoning
ordinance. When it is impossible to use the land for the intended pur-
pose, there can be no "need" and hence no taking. The Housing Law
has provided a means for a housing authority to extricate itself from
this apparent dilemma. Under the law, a city is authorized to enter into
an agreement with a housing authority for the "planning, replanning,
zoning and re-zoning" of land with relation to housing projects.2 This
type of contract arrangement is widely employed. St. Stephen's Club v.
Youngstown Metropolitan Housing Authority is a good example of the
effectiveness of such an agreement.2 3 In this chse an appropriation was
made pursuant to an agreement of the City to re-zone the acquired
area for multiple housing. In view of the agreement it was held to be
no defense to the appropriation that the existing zoning excluded the
intended use for which the land was appropriated. Such an agreement,
as authorized under the Ohio Housing Law,24 serves not only to carry
20 State ex reL Synod of Ohio v. Joseph, 139 Ohio St. 229, 39 N.E. 2d 515
(1942) ; see also supra notes 5 and 6.
21 St. Stephen's Club v. Youngstown Metropolitan Housing Authority, supra
note 13; People ex rel. Gutknecht v. Chicago, 414 Ill. 600, 111 N.E. 2d 626 (1953);
Oliver v. Clairton, 374 Pa. 353, 98 A. 2d 47 (1953).
22 Seigel, supra note 3.
23 Supra note 13; Blumenschein v. Housing Authority of Pittsburgh, 379 Pa.
566, 109 A. 2d 331 (1954), upheld a housing project and the concomitant co-
operation agreement over objections that the present zoning would be interfered
with.
24 OHIO REV. CODE §3735.52(E), (H).
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out the purpose of the statute, but also assures performance on the part
of the city to conform land use in accordance with housing projects.
Once these contracts have been accepted, the city cannot refuse to co-
operate and exercise its powers to effect the completion of the project.2 5
In the case of Borek v. Golder, involving such a contract, the New York
court commented that the acute need of housing and the trend toward
multiple units is so generally accepted that a change of zoning to permit
such development is not sufficient to void the appropriation once the site
appears to be wise and sound.28
The assurance of re-zoning fulfills the condition of local responsi-
bility required under the Federal Act.2 7 Actual re-zoning, as apparently
contended by the Authority, is not a prerequisite to receiving Federal
loans or subsidies. Undoubtedly, the cooperation law is an important
provision. The Authority in the present case could have avoided its
difficulties by making an agreement with the City to re-zone, applying
for Federal aid, and then trying to appropriate the property.
In the final analysis, it appears that the real concern of the Court
was that the City was using its zoning power for the ulterior purpose of
holding down the value of the property until final appropriation. Obvi-
ously, by freezing the status quo it could prevent the expansion of in-
dustry which would increase the value of the land.2 8 This clearly would
be an abusive use of the police power to allow the City to restrict
property use in contemplation of possible appropriation.
The problem of land value illustrates the conflicting interests that
exist between the landowner and the city. The landowner wants to
protect his property interests. He has a constitutional right to make use
of his land so long as he does not endanger the public welfare. This
right can only be yielded to the extent it is necessary to serve the greater
25 Under recent case law it would seem that there is no longer room to doubt
that a successor city legislative body is bound by the action of its predecessor in
entering into a cooperation agreement. Housing Authority v. Los Angeles, 38 Cal.
2d 853, 243 P. 2d 515 (1952); State ex rel. Helena Housing Authority v. City
Council of Helena, 125 Mont. 592, 242 P. 250 (1952) ; Borek v. Golder, 190 Misc.
366, 74 N.Y. Supp. 2d 675 (1947).
26 Supra note 25. It must be borne in mind that the legal relation of housing
to zoning is not precisely the same as that of any private building project. The
facility of zoning change is grounded in a statutory grant of power "to plan or
replan, zone or rezone any part of such state public body," and "to do all things
necessary or convenient to aid and cooperate. . . " OHIO REV. CODE §3735.52(D),
(F). Here the suitability of the zoning may depend greatly on the ownership,
i.e. the public who has funds to develop and expects little monetary return.
Cf. supra note 7.
27 42 U.S.C.A. §§1451-1455.
28 Henle v. City of Euclid, supra 18. This is particularly important as to the
compensation that will be paid upon condemnation. An owner is entitled to be paid
only the value of the property in its condition and situation at the time if is taken,
Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246 (1934).
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interests of the community." 9 Yet, the landowner may abuse this right
by speculating on the future appropriation by the city. By undertaking
expansion prior to appropriation, the land value is enhanced to the
detriment of the taxpayers. On the other hand, the city wants to limit
public expenditures 'by preventing the value of the land from rising.
Some price must be paid by the landowner when the police power is
properly used. Yet, there should be some assurance that the landowner's
rights will not fall prey to the self interest of the city.30 The possibiliity
that the City was attempting to suppress land value is fortified by the
Authority's subsequent offer to allow the plaintiffs to enter evidence of
the value of the land "as though it had not been rezoned." Although
such an attempt would result in an approbrious use of power, this alone
does not justify throwing out the zoning ordinance. To reach a decision
on this ground entails going behind the face of the ordinance to the
legislative motive. The use of such a subjective test is outside the scope
of judicial review. Regardless of the ulterior motive, the Court could
only consider if the re-zoning of the land was reasonable from the
standpoint of the immediate neighborhood and/or the community as a
whole. If this were the situation, one must sympathize with the position
in which the Court found itself. Nevertheless, this is an example of the
classic statement that hard cases make bad law. If we are to protect our
legislative-administrative process, the courts must be held to an objective
test even though the ulterior motive behind an enactment sometimes
appears questionable.
The final decision could be explained on three grounds. One, that
the land was unsuitable for multiple housing. Since the Court never
specifically found the area unsuitable, it might be assumed that it un-
justifiably interfered by substituting its judgment for that of the City.
Second, that the tract was remote from the deprived areas. Such a
criterion is erroneous under the doctrine of comprehensive zoning and
would not justify the ultimate decision. Third, that the City rezoned
to hold down land value. Since the ulterior motive behind legislation is
beyond the scope of the judicial consideration, this could not justify the
Court's interference.
Housing and redevelopment have made great strides during the last
decades and if it is to meet the future demands it must be controlled but
not impaired. Such might be the result if the opinion of the present case
is not limited in its application.
Joanne Tl1wrton
29 See supra note 2.
30 The use of cooperation agreements might enable the city to appropriate
the land more readily. This would aid the city's interests and protect the land-
owner from giving up his property rights without compensation. Zoning should
not be used as a guise for eminent domain, Kessler v. Smith. supra note 6.
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the Federal Administrative Procedure Act. Particular emphasis will be
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trative bodies, administrative courts, and the future of administrative law.
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program, and occupational disease.
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